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Abstract: 
This paper deals critically with the process of coming to terms with ‘genocide’. It starts from 
the observation that conventional philosophical and legal approaches to capturing the 
essence of ‘genocide’ through an improved definition necessarily fail to adapt to the ever-
changing nature of political violence. Faced with this challenge, the paper suggests that the 
contemporary debate on genocide (and its denial) should be complemented with a focus on 
transforming the perceptive and interpretive frameworks through which acts of violence are 
discussed in the public sphere. The main purpose of this paper is to contribute, from the 
vantage point of political theory, to this debate by offering a novel normative perspective on 
negative reactions to genocide. Hence, I argue that it is productive to speak of ‘genocide 
blindness’ in cases when the members of the public sphere are simply incapable of seeing an 
instance of violence as genocidal. To establish this claim, the paper introduces Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s reflections on ‘aspect-seeing’ so as to underline the importance of changing 
the way how political violence is perceived and interpreted. In a second step, the paper turns 
to María Pía Lara’s theory of storytelling as a concrete mechanism for triggering and 
instituting this kind of change. 
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I. The conundrum around ‘genocide’: Common strategies of decontestation 
Ever since Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ to capture the novelty of the horrors 
of the Holocaust and of other crimes (particularly the Ottoman campaign against Anatolian 
Armenians), legal theorists, practical philosophers and social scientists have been struggling 
over the exact meaning of the term. (Cooper, 2007; Lemkin, 2008) Given the political 
controversies around, and the internal tensions within the term itself, this struggle is not 
astonishing. The political controversies around genocide can be explained by the fact that 
states accused of planning to commit, or of committing, or of having committed genocide 
are de facto outcast members of the international society, on whom economic, diplomatic 
and military sanctions might be imposed.1 Many states obfuscate their genocidal actions 
once they are met with accusations. This strategy extends to both past and ongoing 
genocides, as numerous examples from recent times show. For the latest case, just consider 
the statement of Serbia’s President, Nikolić, that there ‘was no genocide in Srebrenica’ 
(Anon., 2012a) – a proclamation that contradicts all the available evidence, almost 20 years 
after the massacres have occurred. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to enrich the argument around genocide by offering a 
novel perspective on negative reactions to genocide. I will show that it is productive to speak 
of ‘genocide blindness’ in cases when the members of the public sphere are simply incapable 
of seeing an instance of violence as genocidal. This negative reaction ought to be held apart 
from cases of ‘genocide denial’. Normatively, the paper seeks to contribute to the 
interdisciplinary discussion through a new dimension that highlights the perceptive and 
interpretive frameworks to ‘read’ violence. I shall try to answer the question how we may 
cultivate, and continue cultivating, the faculty to envisage instances of violence as 
subsumable under the rubric of genocide. In this sense, the paper hopes to partake in the 
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wider ‘genocide debate’ (Beachler, 2011), which brings together a variety of actors, from 
engaged academics, to political stakeholders, to affected victims. Since this debate is first 
and foremost practically oriented towards the battle against genocide’s social reality, the 
paper’s theoretical claim should be understood as ancillary to this battle. According to the 
underlying vision of political theory, its primary function is ‘not to talk about justice in the 
abstract but to do justice to the subject matter in the sense of understanding and clarifying 
the practices of justice.’ (Gunnell, 2013, 99) 
 
We can appreciate why a novel perspective on negative reactions to genocide is necessary 
once we scrutinize the internal tensions within the term. The established definition of 
‘genocide’ in international law is far from being unequivocal. The standard codification in 
the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (78 U. N. 
T. S. 277) defines genocide as  
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Schabas, 
2009, 176) 
Few definitions in international law have initiated that much disagreement among experts 
and laypersons alike. Almost every element of the definition has triggered fierce debates, 
from the kinds of groups protected by the Convention, to the precise understanding of ‘intent 
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to destroy’. (May, 2010) Another well-known dilemma concerns the issue of what 
constitutes a ‘part’ of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. (Power, 2002, 65) These 
quandaries have led one author to imaginatively propose to replace the legal term ‘genocide’ 
with the notion of ‘atrocity crimes’, which would encompass crimes against humanity, 
serious war crimes and violations of humanitarian law. (Scheffer, 2006) The standard 
codification of genocide is also increasingly at odds with public debates. David Luban, for 
example, asserts that the jurisprudential argument on the distinction between ‘genocide’ and 
‘crimes against humanity’ is going into the opposite direction from the media controversies 
around ongoing violence. Examining the Darfur debate in 2007, he points out that the 
requirement to establish the perpetrators’ intent to commit genocide might run counter to 
everyday discourse, where ‘we think of genocide as deliberate annihilation of masses of 
civilians, regardless of the specific intention. That means that for non-lawyers […] the crime 
against humanity of exterminating civilian populations is genocide.’ (Luban, 2006, 308) 
 
Due to these issues, it has become evident that ‘genocide’ is as much a technical term in 
international law as it is a polemical term in public debates. People vehemently clash over 
the question whether a concrete instance of violence should be named ‘genocide’. The public 
debate usually goes through cycles of contestation, where the past, the present and the future 
of a community are turned into battlefields. Consequently, several authors (Gallagher, 2009; 
Powell, 2007; Straus, 2001) have intimated that ‘genocide’ might be considered an 
‘essentially contested concept’, whose meaning cannot be settled through conceptual 
analysis alone. (Freeden, 2004; Gallie, 1956) The discussion in section III will show that 
dubbing ‘genocide’ an essentially contested concept is not unproblematic. According to 
Wittgenstein’s account of language-games, which underpins the argument in this paper, it is 
erroneous to assume that one stable, yet contested concept serves as the basis of the various 
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words we use to describe a phenomenon as ‘genocide’. The confusion in the literature stems 
from the fuzzy distinction between concepts and words, which neither Gallie nor his 
followers have consistently delineated. Although I will expound more how Wittgenstein may 
assist us in overcoming this unfortunate confusion, suffice it here to say that certain words in 
political discourse – such as ‘genocide’ – have over time become ‘characteristically 
contested, but this is often because […] they have historically accrued a great deal of either 
approbation or disapprobation’ (Gunnell, 2011, 132).2 
 
These important reservations notwithstanding, it seems accurate to observe that, faced with 
the contestedness of ‘genocide’, theorists as well as practitioners have attempted to 
‘decontest’ the word in various ways. Decontesting involves that a decision is taken to 
regulate and normalize the various uses of a word. (Freeden, 1998, 55–60) A decision of this 
kind is not only pressing within academic circles. For political discourse in general to 
function on a steady basis, it is vital that the meaning of the words in use is controlled. The 
two most common ways to engage in decontestation are (1) ‘the attempt to attach very 
precise allocations of meanings to indeterminate concepts’ and (2) the ‘stipulative ascription 
of meaning to a term’ (Freeden, 2005, 121). With regard to genocide, these two strategies 
translate into the following routes towards decontestation: many (analytical) philosophers 
grappling with the notion of ‘genocide’ interpret their role as one of settling the dispute over 
its ambiguity and indeterminacy. In other words, these philosophers do not only believe that 
decontestation can be fully achieved; for them, the assumption that ‘genocide’ might be 
characteristically contested proves to be fallacious. The goal, then, is to purify the word from 
its confusing elements such that an uncontestable core can finally materialize. Without going 
into the subtle variations in these attempts to dissect the word ‘genocide’, let us call this 
reckoning with the challenge of decontesting ‘foundationalism’. (Herzog, 1985; Ripstein, 
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1987) I employ this term in the sense of grounding the obligation to prevent and punish 
genocide in a feature that makes the moral nature of genocide uniquely relevant. How this 
feature is characterized differs from one foundationalist account to another, but they are all 
similar insofar as they necessarily appeal to one such feature, or several such features. 
(Abed, 2006; Boghossian, 2010; Lee, 2009; Macleod, 2012) 
 
This approach can be juxtaposed with another one that stipulates the term’s meaning by 
referring to existing instruments in international law. In today’s debate, lawyers and legal 
theorists often follow this route towards decontestation. While acknowledging the need to 
revise the UN definition, they deem the existing instruments as sufficient for the purpose of 
preventing and punishing genocide. I shall call this strategy ‘legalism’ (Shklar, 1986), 
wielding again a broad brush to paint a picture of rather diverse approaches. Legalism about 
genocide implies that the provisions in international law are construed as decoupled from 
politics. What is more, legalism characteristically expresses an ‘excessive faith’ (Posner, 
2009, xii) in the rather weak institutions of international law. 
 
Neither foundationalism nor legalism manages to cope with the challenge of coming to terms 
with ‘genocide’. Their attempts to decontest ‘genocide’ are understandable as endeavors to 
defuse the internal tensions within the word, but they are futile in their overall ambitions. 
Given the unavoidably polemical character of the term, its radical openness to abuse, and its 
persistent exposure to cycles of contestation, it would be overly optimistic to ascribe the role 
of the final arbiter to either philosophical or legal discourse. This does, of course, not imply 
that there is no role at all to play for either philosophical or legal discourse in the wider 
genocide debate. However, this role is rather less comprehensive than either (analytical) 
philosophers or legal theorists suggest. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II carves out in more detail the distinction 
between genocide denial and genocide blindness. Section III turns to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of ‘aspect-seeing’ as an inspiration for rethinking the way in which ‘genocide’ 
ought to be broached. This appropriation of Wittgenstein, it should be mentioned at the 
outset, is rather limited in scope and therefore distinct from a full-fledged ‘Wittgensteinian’ 
approach to political theory. Section IV attempts to draw out the implications such a flexible 
approach to capturing ‘genocide’ might have. It focuses on the force of storytelling to 
continually change how we perceive and interpret violence. 
 
II. From denial to blindness: Negative reactions to genocide 
Let us begin by elaborating further on the distinction between two negative reactions to 
‘genocide’. The first reaction, genocide denial, can be described as the willful negation or 
misrepresentation of intersubjectively redeemable facts that prove the occurrence, in the past 
or in the present, of genocidal activities in a given territory. Hence, deniers proffer claims 
that reveal a sharp conflict with historical scholarship, even if they often mimic scholarly 
practices by purporting to put forward ‘revisionist’ accounts of past events. (Totten and 
Bartrop, 2008) Most participants in the debate on the definition of ‘genocide’ concentrate 
their efforts on the fight against various forms of denial. This is an intricate struggle along 
various frontlines, for Israel Charny has shown that denial comes in at least six different 
fashions, ranging from malevolent bigotry to the nihilistic depiction of violence as 
inevitable. (Charny, 2003) Although there are considerable differences between the diverse 
strategies to improve the definition of ‘genocide’, they are all similar insofar as their goal is 
to inhibit the willful negation or misrepresentation of genocide. In an open society governed 
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by freedom of speech, undermining genocide deniers requires first and foremost the 
development of historical scholarship.3 
 
When dealing with an ongoing genocide, the situation looks rather different.4 The reasons 
for not acknowledging the occurrence of a continuing genocide can often be traced back to a 
lack of political will on the part of those who might be capable of stopping the violence. 
Many have expressed the suspicion that the principal reason why the atrocities in Darfur 
were not officially recognized as genocidal was that the signatories to the UN Convention 
feared such recognition would trigger a duty to intervene. (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 
2009; Udombana, 2005) On this account, the problem of any engagement with ongoing 
genocide is entrenched in the double standards of Western powers, for they regularly fail to 
live up to the ‘responsibility to protect’. The case of Darfur has accentuated that this 
evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention is highly contentious. (Bellamy, 2005; De 
Waal, 2007; Williams and Bellamy, 2005) Western powers are typically averse to calling 
some forms of violence genocidal when this contravenes their strategic interest. Viewed 
from this cosmopolitan perspective, the biggest challenge for preventing and punishing 
genocide is the hypocrisy of Western powers as ‘norm carriers’. The flipside of this 
argument is that potential interveners will not hesitate to attach the label ‘genocide’ to a 
conflict if a military involvement is in their strategic interest. Mahmood Mamdani (2010) 
dubs this propensity the ‘politics of naming’. Realist authors have highlighted that a hidden 
agenda can sometimes be identified behind attempts to designate atrocities as genocidal: 
Western powers will invoke humanity in order to conceal imperialist aspirations. Both the 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (Zolo, 2002) and the failed military involvement in 
Darfur (Mamdani, 2009) have been interpreted as interest-driven wars.  
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While it is undoubtedly true that political will, or rather the lack thereof, influences the 
official recognition of particular genocides, the conundrum around defining the word 
‘genocide’ cuts deeper than either cosmopolitans or realists want to admit. As Henry 
Theriault has stressed (2010), capturing ‘genocide’ through a binding definition is such a 
difficult undertaking because any definition remains radically open to abuse: perpetrators 
and deniers will do everything in their power to ensure that a certain act of violence does not 
‘really’ amount to genocide. They exploit the ‘metaphysical indeterminacies’ (Theriault, 
2010, 495) in the UN definition to shield their actions from prosecution. While the denial of 
past and ongoing genocides is dominating media controversies, Theriault’s argument about 
‘anticipatory denial’ brings to the fore a more fundamental issue with any attempt to define 
genocide. Anticipatory denial occurs when perpetrators modify their planned actions so as to 
circumvent the charge of genocide. As an example of such a denial reaching out into the 
future, Theriault lists the widespread and systematic rape by Serbian soldiers in the war 
against the Bosnians during the 1990s. By using rape as weapon, the army temporarily 
succeeded in deflecting the charge of genocide. (Bellamy, 2012) Today, our perception 
differs: ‘genocidal rape’ is widely accepted as a valid description of the acts that had been 
taken during the wars in Ex-Yugoslavia; it is now consensually understood, both in 
international law and in public debates, that sexual violence plays an integral part in any 
genocide. (Eboe-Osuji, 2007; Miller, 2009; Schott, 2011) But this new way of seeing 
violence is a consequence of the ingeniously planned actions of perpetrators, who used the 
then-hegemonic definition of genocide to commit heinous crimes. Confronted with this 
dialectic between hegemonic definition and emerging violence, foundationalists and legalists 
insist on improving the definition in such a way that its blind spots are eliminated. However, 
the very mechanism through which any definition might inadvertently contribute to 
generating new forms of violence reveals the limitations of these attempts. 
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Let us now consider a different case. What about those who simply fail to perceive and to 
interpret an act of violence as genocidal? How should we judge their failure? Are they 
culpable to the same extent as Holocaust deniers, who deliberately distort historical records? 
Are we justified in attributing guilt to those observers who did not immediately recognize 
the genocidal character of mass rape during the war in Ex-Yugoslavia? And what about 
connecting anthropogenic climate change to genocide – is this conjecture just a bizarre 
exaggeration, typical of ecological hypersensitivity; or is it rather a prophetic portrayal of the 
fate of states such as Tuvalu, whose inhabitants might soon be expelled from their atoll-
country, due to rising sea levels?5 
 
If the social reality of genocide is constantly in flux, it might be excessively demanding to 
expect from the members of the public sphere to be sensitive to all new types of genocidal 
acts. Perhaps the members of the public sphere are not at all unwilling to see rape or climate 
change as genocidal, but their perceptive and interpretive frameworks – the apparatus 
through which they view the world – are ill-equipped to subsume these new forms of 
violence under the existing rubric. Accordingly, it might be the case that those who fail to 
perceive and interpret an act of violence as genocide are capable of grasping genocide in 
those cases that neatly map on the UN Convention. Yet, their over-all understanding of 
genocide is so restrictive that it cannot be extended to novel cases. 
 
This is where we leave the realm of genocide denial. It is beyond any doubt that denial 
remains one of the most challenging issues in liberal democracies, where it is imperative to 
protect freedom of speech. But once we have realized that new forms of violence arise 
permanently, and that the search for an improved definition of genocide cannot stop this 
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emergence once and for all, we would be well advised to direct our attention to what I have 
called ‘genocide blindness’. Genocide blindness, the second negative reaction, is related to, 
but not identical with, denial maneuvers in past, present or future conflicts. It is not a willful 
act at all, but rather a sort of affliction from which one can suffer, without necessarily having 
done anything to bring it on oneself. Genocide blindness denotes the inability to perceive 
and interpret an occurrence of violence as genocidal. Formulated like this, the meaning of 
‘genocide blindness’ hinges on the exact sense of ‘perceiving’ and ‘interpreting’, which the 
following section will explore. 
 
III. ‘Seeing x as genocide’: Wittgenstein on aspect-seeing 
For us to devise an antidote to genocide blindness, we need to better grasp the nature of this 
affliction. What kind of blindness are we talking about here? Can there be a remedy to it? In 
order to answer these questions I will now mobilize Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy.6 Before delving into the more specific discussion, I must clarify an important 
issue I have only gestured at in the introduction, namely how Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
bears on the idea that certain concepts might be ‘essentially contested’.7 John G. Gunnell 
convincingly argues that the very idea of an ‘essentially contested concept’ is misguided 
from a Wittgensteinian point of view, because it invites the supposition that beneath the 
struggles over meaning one universal concept could be detected. Therefore, claiming that 
‘genocide’ would be an essentially contested concept lures us into incorrectly believing that 
a conceptual core could emerge, if only the definitional struggles over the meaning subsided. 
However, Wittgenstein’s account of language-games builds on the distinction between 
words and concepts, as Gunnell explains: 
The best short answer to the question of what constitutes concepts is to say that they 
are kinds of things designated and discriminated by various forms of linguistic usage. 
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[…] The crucial question of how words are related to concepts can be answered in 
part by saying that certain, but certainly not all, words refer to concepts, and this is 
basically equivalent to saying that such words refer to classes of things and are used 
to talk about particular instances of those things. (Gunnell, 2011, 136, 138) 
From this perspective, the notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’ has limited purchase, 
for it is the word, and not the concept of ‘genocide’, whose meaning is disputed. Still, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy sheds light on the topic of this paper because it exemplifies a 
critical type of inquiry that ‘leaves everything as it is’ (Gunnell, 2013, 84). Since the wider 
genocide debate, which involves engaged academics, political stakeholders and affected 
victims, cannot be settled through foundationalist or legalist endeavors to decontest the term, 
such a form of inquiry commences by openly admitting that genocide primarily constitutes a 
practical, not a theoretical, challenge that contemporary societies around the globe must 
confront. Surpassing the internal tensions within the term ‘genocide’ will do little to 
comprehend the social reality of genocide, which remains, as we have seen in section II, 
constantly in flux. To draw once again on Gunnell, what comes first are the ‘practices of 
justice’, which political theory then needs to reconstruct. I will submit that one possible 
avenue for probing these practices in the context of genocide is to interrogate Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on ‘aspect-seeing’. The following engagement with Wittgenstein should not, 
however, be mistaken for a full-fledged ‘Wittgensteinian’ approach to political theory: for 
this, its purpose is simply too restricted. My use of Wittgenstein is primarily motivated by 
the intuition that ‘aspect-seeing’ has ramifications for the genocide debate, which have not 
yet been studied. 
 
Commentators (Day and Krebs, 2010; Glock, 1996) point out that the most thorough 
exposition of aspect-seeing can be discovered in what has earlier been considered the second 
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part of the Philosophical Investigations. (Wittgenstein, 2009) In this text, Wittgenstein uses 
‘picture-objects’ – such as the famous duck-rabbit – to explain how an aspect of something 
can ‘dawn’ on us, how we may, from one moment to another, recognize the aspect of 
something. When looking at the duck-rabbit we suddenly perceive it as a rabbit and then as a 
duck. Does new information impel us to ‘see something as something’? Or is it our mind that 
tricks us into perceiving things the way we perceive them? Wittgenstein’s approach to 
‘aspect perception’ locates this activity between normal seeing and interpreting or thinking: 
it is ‘half visual experience, half thought’ (Wittgenstein, 2009, 207e). Thus, aspect-seeing 
entails an active imagination that normal seeing does not require: 
The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination. In other words, the 
concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’. Doesn’t it take 
imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? […] Seeing an 
aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is such an order as ‘Imagine this!’, 
and also, ‘Now see the figure like this!’; but not ‘Now see this leaf green!’. 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, 224e) 
A crucial point in Wittgenstein’s remarks is that aspect perception is not a purely subjective 
activity: it can be communicated and shared with others, and thus resembles interpretation. 
(Gunnell, 2013, 88) Indeed, some commentators have maintained that aspect perception 
opens up the possibility for ‘certain moments of intimacy’ (Baz, 2000, 99) with other people. 
Wittgenstein claims that aspect-seeing is paradoxically both similar to, and distinct from, 
normal seeing. (Hester, 1966; Wittgenstein, 2009, 207e) This is illustrated through an 
elaborate discussion of the opposite of aspect-seeing, namely ‘aspect blindness’. It is vital to 
notice that Wittgenstein uses this term in two different manners: Aspect blindness is, on the 
one hand, the ‘inability to experience aspect-dawning’ (Glock, 1996, 39). This means that an 
aspect-blind person cannot perceive the change from one aspect to another, but she can at 
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least see one of the image’s aspects: either the duck or the rabbit. On the other hand, 
Wittgenstein also makes an instructive comparison with the ‘lack of a “musical ear”’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, 225e) in order to elucidate the particular deficiency that is aspect 
blindness. Thus, aspect blindness may also occur when a person cannot perceive any aspects 
at all. Such a person would be incapable of seeing either the duck or the rabbit in the image, 
perceiving instead just a randomly shaped line and a dot. 
 
In what ways can political theory benefit from this account of ‘seeing something as 
something’? Several authors – out of which I select two, whose interpretations are 
particularly in tune with this paper’s ambition – have sought to appropriate Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of aspect-seeing for their specific projects.8 Aletta Norval, our first interlocutor, 
attempts to use Wittgensteinian insights to make sense of ‘democratic identification’ in 
transitional moments, taking as a starting observation her personal experience whilst voting 
in the first free elections in South Africa in 1994. (Norval, 2006) She raises a hard question: 
What allows people to see themselves as democratic subjects, when a new regime comes to 
power after a period of authoritarian rule? Against deliberative theorists, Norval maintains 
that to answer this question one must explore fundamental processes of identification. 
Founding and transitional moments necessarily induce a break in the ‘political grammars’ 
we utilize to account for ourselves – and deliberative theorists are at a loss when it comes to 
dealing with such disruptions. The substitution of ‘apartheid’ with ‘equality’ would count as 
an example of such a transformation in political grammar. The point about grammars 
enabling a change in subject formation is that they must achieve two goals at the same time: 
to articulate a novel framework for citizens to interpret themselves as democrats and to 
remain intelligible to those who have not been democrats before. (Norval, 2006, 243) 
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In Norval’s reading, Wittgenstein’s exploration of aspect-seeing is relevant for democratic 
identification insofar as it captures the puzzling effect that any political transition or 
founding moment generates: the exhilarating surprise over what is new is immediately 
accompanied by the sobering realization that not much has actually changed. (Norval, 2006, 
246) This effect is important because it assures that the ‘new democrats’ still consider 
themselves as the same persons as before. Just as with the duck-rabbit, the change in subject 
formation induced by a political transition or founding moment marks a discontinuity with 
the past, without necessarily following a singular rupture. Norval’s depiction of the 
democratic subject is therefore decidedly ‘anti-heroic’ (Norval, 2006, 245–246): 
transformations do not necessarily rely on exceptional individuals alone; they often depend 
on incremental alterations in ethical habits and practices. 
 
Norval’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is enlightening because she draws a further 
distinction between ‘aspect-dawning’ and ‘aspect change’. While admitting that, strictly 
speaking, this distinction cannot be found in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, Norval argues that we 
find in his work the resources for parsing the first instantiation of a new political grammar 
(‘dawning’) from the continuous efforts to keep novel forms of identification alive 
(‘change’). Although the two moments are obviously intertwined with each other, they 
necessitate separate activities from the citizens: 
If democracy is conceived as a never-ending struggle, then the mode of subjectivity 
supporting it must be one that can take account of this. Hence the emphasis on a 
reengagement and reactivation of democratic practices. As we know, the simple 
repetition of practices, while necessary, may in the long run fail to sustain democratic 
identification. (Norval, 2006, 249) 
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David Owen, our second interlocutor, adds to the debate about Wittgenstein’s impact on 
political theory through his innovative concept of ‘aspectival captivity’ (Owen, 2002). In an 
essay on the relationship between genealogy and Critical Theory, Owen juxtaposes 
‘aspectival’ with ‘ideological captivity’. The difference between these two forms of being 
held captive can be substantiated in the following manner: 
The primary feature of ideological captivity can be elucidated by reference to the 
concept of ‘false consciousness’. […] The main, contrasting, feature of aspectival 
captivity is that […] the condition of captivity is independent of the truth or falsity of 
the beliefs held by the agent. (Owen, 2002, 217) 
Owen argues that ideological and aspectival captivity each require different forms of critical 
engagement. Overcoming ideological captivity calls for employing the tools of ideology 
critique in order to instigate processes of agential self-reflection that uncover and dispel 
‘false consciousness’. The focus in ideology critique lies, thus, on the agent’s own capacity 
to fathom that her prior beliefs were factually false and in need of correction. In the case of 
aspectival captivity, on the other hand, liberation will follow another path. The tools for 
liberation from aspectival captivity can be extracted from the Nietzschean and Foucauldian 
project of genealogy. From this description, it is evident that, while both ideology critique 
and genealogy contribute to ‘enlightenment and emancipation’ (Owen, 2002, 227), each 
proposes distinct ways in which liberation can be realized. Thus, genealogy does not aim at 
revealing the falsity of beliefs, but rather seeks to fulfill several interrelated tasks: 
(a) it identifies a picture which holds us captive […], 
(b) this account involves a redescription of this picture which contrasts it with 
another way of seeing the issue in order to free us from captivity to this picture, 
(c) it provides an account of how we have become held captive by this picture […] 
(Owen, 2002, 224) 
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Scrutinizing different contexts, in which practical reasoning and action take place, Norval 
and Owen emphasize the importance of ‘seeing things aright’. Norval’s distinction between 
‘aspect-dawning’ and ‘aspect change’ as well as Owen’s notion of ‘aspectival captivity’ are 
the two contributions to the massive secondary literature on Wittgenstein that are most 
illuminating when exploring ‘genocide blindness’. 
 
IV. Neither sacred nor banal: Historical precedent and political imagination 
In the last part of the paper, I shall turn from diagnosis to cure. The main pointer in 
Wittgenstein is that aspect blindness, and by implication genocide blindness, derives from a 
deficiency in imaginative powers. It is not simply a failure to see ‘something as something’, 
it is also a failure to think and reflect appropriately. When making (selective) use of 
Wittgenstein’s observations to discuss genocide, we therefore ought to start by recalling the 
double meaning of aspect blindness. Genocide blindness, I have argued, pertains to the first 
semantic layer, that is, the inability to perceive aspect-dawning. A ‘genocide-blind’ person 
is, thus, not someone who cannot see any violent act at all as genocidal. While it might be 
the case that some people are ‘genocide-blind’ in this extreme sense, I am more intrigued by 
the difficulties that arise when people cannot experience a change in what ought to count as 
genocide. The crucial concern, then, is: How may we cultivate, and continue cultivating, the 
faculty to envisage instances of violence as subsumable under the rubric of genocide? 
 
In answering this question, we should again look into the case of ‘genocidal rape’. It is fair 
to assume that not everybody who failed to see the Serbian campaign of mass rape as 
genocidal was a ruthless denier. Rather, it is plausible to suggest that at least some of those 
who have been blind to the genocidal character of mass rape firmly oriented themselves on 
the existing definition, which at that point did not cover mass rape. This fixation made it in 
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turn impossible for them to perceive and interpret the crimes in such a way that they were 
subsumable under the rubric of genocide. This negative reaction to ‘genocidal rape’ does not 
involve the willful negation or misrepresentation of intersubjectively redeemable facts about 
genocide. 
 
In holding denial apart from blindness, I have not yet determined whether the cause for a 
particular case of blindness is ideological or aspectival captivity. However, drawing on 
Owen’s account, it is palpable that both ideological and aspectival captivity might be 
causing genocide blindness. People who fail to see an instance of violence as genocidal 
might be under the spell of false consciousness, and therefore be victims of ‘ideological 
captivity’. Deniers might manipulate and misinform them about the specificity of the violent 
acts so as to divert attention from the atrocities. In this case, what is needed to cure this 
affliction is ideology critique of the type described by Owen: enlightenment and 
emancipation through the self-reflection of the actors. But it is likewise possible to speak of 
aspectival captivity when engaging with cases of genocide blindness. Following this line of 
thought, a particular perspective on what acts should count as genocide blinds those who fail 
to perceive a new instance of violence as genocidal. Then people are simply unable to extend 
the label ‘genocide’ to cases that do not fit the hegemonic definition. In this situation, 
enlightenment and emancipation will call for the remedy of offering another way of seeing 
things.9 
 
How could we succeed in devising such a remedy? I have already hinted at the fact that 
Wittgenstein offers a clue through the assertion that a deficiency in imaginative powers lies 
at the heart of ‘aspect blindness’. With respect to genocide, my proposal is that enhancing 
political imagination can provide a rejoinder to the challenge of ‘seeing x as genocide’. The 
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focus on political imagination attempts to shift the debate, away from its narrow concern 
with improving the definition of what should count as genocide, and towards the perceptive 
and interpretive frameworks through which violence is viewed. What, then, is political 
imagination, and how does it bear on genocide blindness? The cultivation of political 
imagination hinges on narratives of past human suffering that change the perceptive and 
interpretive frameworks of the public. Such narratives disrupt the way in which instances of 
violence are normally discussed, and thereby contribute to liberating the members of the 
public sphere from aspectival captivity. Liberation of this kind can only be achieved if the 
members of the public sphere are capable of drawing lessons of moral learning from the 
past. 
 
In submitting that storytelling can transform the public’s perceptive and interpretive 
frameworks to become more sensitive to new forms of violence, I follow María Pía Lara’s 
‘post-metaphysical’ discussion of evil. (Lara, 2007) This account is heavily indebted to 
Hannah Arendt’s notion of storytelling as disclosure. (Arendt, 1998, 175–199) While it 
would be fruitful to reconstruct Arendt’s traces, as numerous publications have illustrated 
(Benhabib, 1990; Disch, 1993; Luban, 1983; Speight, 2011), I will concentrate on Lara’s 
appropriation of storytelling for a simple reason: her ideas about how we may learn from the 
past are more neatly attuned to the spirit of this paper. Yet, my turn to Lara does not imply 
that this would be the only useful account of storytelling. Neo-Hegelians, such as Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1984) and Charles Taylor (1989), have developed distinctively narrative 
approaches to ethics. What sets Lara apart from these neo-Hegelians is that she ties 
storytelling to collective politics, while both MacIntyre and Taylor associate narratives with 
the constitution of individual selfhood.10 
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Lara’s suggestion is that narratives presented in various media – from intimate 
autobiographical testimonies to big screen blockbusters – help societies in their efforts to 
grapple with the past. Storytelling can unveil the historical conditions of evildoing and of 
human suffering in ways that academic scholarship alone cannot: it may trigger large-scale 
‘aspect-dawning’, in Norval’s sense. Powerful stories force the readers and viewers to grasp 
violence in a different light. This means that certain narratives initiate societal learning 
processes as they impel the members of the public sphere to reflect on their community’s 
past in a critical vein. Lara insists on the lessons to be drawn from particular events that 
exemplify evil: 
My theory of reflective judgment focuses on the notion that disclosive language is an 
operation of opening up spaces for moral learning (i.e., seeing things differently). In 
this kind of exercise of judgment there is a conceptual connection between our 
historical understanding of an atrocity as a particular action (provided by different 
narratives) and the way we name it with a morally disclosive term. (Lara, 2007, 10) 
This passage shows how Lara’s account of moral learning through storytelling might 
beneficially inform the debate around genocide blindness. Powerful stories construct a 
‘moral filter’ (Lara, 2007, 27), through which the history of atrocities can be structured. 
These stories seek to shape the reader’ and viewers’ imagination by devising a sharpened 
lens for reading and viewing the world, and by drafting an innovative vocabulary for talking 
about it. Lara cites the example of the word ‘Holocaust’ in order to demonstrate the strengths 
of her narrative take on evil. It took more than 20 years for the term to establish itself, 
through historical research into the murder of European Jews, but also through survivors’ 
biographical testimonials and later through divulgation in commercially successful movies 
and TV series. As a neologism it emitted a ‘semantic shock’ that stirred the imagination of 
the public to see the atrocities in a new light. Although far from being uncontroversial, the 
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term ‘Holocaust’ is today widely used to describe the Nazi crimes.11 Arguably, the term 
helped to account not only for the historical specificity of those crimes, but it also widened 
the scope of public debates to such an extent that evils, which might previously have been 
deemed unimaginable, became effable. 
 
The example of the word ‘Holocaust’ stresses that the most effective way to modify 
perceptive and interpretive frameworks is, paradoxically, to foster a continuous engagement 
with historical instances of violence. This is why Lara concedes that narratives of human 
suffering always have a telos: to enable ‘learning from catastrophes’ (Habermas, 1998). The 
narratives thus create a link between a community’s past, its present and its future. Such a 
link sparks a transformation within the fabric of a community, starting what Norval calls 
‘aspect change’. Therefore, societal learning only occurs when the momentous effect of 
‘aspect-dawning’ leads to a broader pattern of ‘aspect change’. But this summoning of past 
instances of violence is under threat by two common developments that can be witnessed in 
many controversies: any semantic shock, not only the one induced by the term ‘Holocaust’, 
may suffer from either sacralization or banalization. (Lara, 2007, 164) The danger is that the 
semantic shock soon solidifies into a paradigm that preempts the exercise of judgment and 
closes the horizon of public debates. Once a specific event, like the Holocaust, is turned into 
such a paradigm, commentators quickly take a further step and either belittle any other 
instance of violence when compared to the Holocaust (thereby sacralizing the Holocaust), or 
they assimilate any instance of violence to the Holocaust (thereby banalizing the Holocaust). 
Both uses of the Holocaust, or of any other specific event, are problematic because they 
stifle the public debate about concrete acts of violence. One upshot of this observation is that 
we should abandon the ‘quest for a sort of total equivalence’ (Bloxham, 2009, 31) between 
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atrocities and the Holocaust, which haunts historical scholarship even today. (Moses, 2002; 
Moshman, 2001; Stone, 2004)12 
 
Still, the perils of sacralizing and banalizing are here to stay: Whenever we refer to a specific 
event from the past to exemplify evildoing and human suffering, we run the risk of 
generating a paradigm that becomes detached from subtle engagement. Eschewing all 
references to the past does not solve the problem since seeing things differently is premised 
on the wager that the exposure to historical experiences renders the members of the public 
sphere more susceptible to future modifications in the social reality of violence. If we 
subscribe to the premise that narratives put the members of the public sphere in a better 
position to keep track with the fluid nature of violence, it follows that we must tackle the 
question of what characterizes a proper lesson from history. Lara clarifies her view by 
stating that powerful narratives instantiate a conversation between the author(s) and the 
public. (Lara, 2007, 12, 38) It is, hence, characteristic of these stories that they actually reach 
and rattle their audience. What is more, the public must respond to the semantic shock in 
such a way that the story is taken up and vindicated. This implies that an agreement on the 
validity of the representation, however minimal, ought to arise between the narrator(s) and 
the audience. Although such an agreement cannot be conceptualized in generic terms, it is 
based on the idea that narratives are validated through “situated impartiality” (Disch, 1993, 
682–688). 
 
Up to this point, the discussion of political imagination took place on a fairly high level of 
abstraction. In order to flesh out the operation of storytelling with more substance I now 
want to highlight the multifaceted appeals to the Srebrenica massacre in the debate around 
the conflicts in Libya and Syria. In 2011, several pundits, both from liberal and conservative 
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media outlets, drew strong parallels between these two conflicts in order to justify military 
intervention in Libya. (Preston, 2011; Simms, 2011) With regard to Syria, Srebrenica was 
once again called upon in 2012 – with exactly the same arguments, creating the same sense 
of urgency – to move the international community towards endorsing its ‘responsibility to 
protect’. (Anon., 2012b; Korski, 2012; Lister, 2012) This indiscriminate invocation of a 
specific event shows that ‘Srebrenica’ has, at least in these controversies, forfeited its 
disclosive function and deteriorated into a deceptive vignette. ‘Srebrenica’ has thus become 
a sacred memory site in the sense that its mere mentioning is supposed to truncate 
deliberations. 
 
Does this mean that all the comparisons between an act of mass atrocity and Srebrenica are 
treacherous? Of course not. While space constraints prevent me from launching on a 
nuanced interpretation of these stories, it is not difficult to find examples for narratives that 
have led to ‘aspect-dawning’ in the public’s eyes. There are several representations of the 
war in Ex-Yugoslavia that have immensely broadened our understanding of violence. As two 
observers remark,  
(c)ivil society has been a key agent of public debate around issues of war crimes and 
justice in BiH with individual intellectuals, journalists, and civil society activists 
often taking the lead on these sensitive subjects. Documentaries, films, and art 
projects have provided alternative avenues for stimulating public debate on dealing 
with the past. (Rangelov and Theros, 2010, 365) 
Internationally acclaimed movies, such as Grbavica (Zbanic, 2006), have cast the Serbian 
campaign of mass rape in the most differentiated light, emphasizing its destructive effects on 
the Bosnian society’s present and future.13 A film like Grbavica might indeed manage to 
transform the viewers’ perceptive and interpretive frameworks as it makes anything but the 
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recognition of mass rape’s genocidal character appear impossible. Despite, or perhaps 
because of, its taboo-shattering plot, the film has been watched by more than 100.000 people 
in Bosnia alone, and has given rise to a civil society initiative whose objective is the 
acknowledgment of reparations claims for rape victims. (Fischer, 2007, xi–xii) 
 
A critic might object to this account of storytelling that it leaves far too many issues in the 
uncertain, betting instead on the disclosive function of narratives.14 I have not elucidated 
with any precision how an agreement between the author(s) and the public might surface. 
Neither have I identified a criterion that will render some stories more legitimate than others. 
There lurks also the danger that the narrative approach might produce a culture of ‘genocide 
hypersensitivity’, in which the public sees genocides everywhere. In short, I have not 
grappled with the normative foundations of the narrative approach. Such foundations are 
indispensable, the critic might insist, because the appeal to stories as such remains 
indeterminate: they may in favorable circumstances foster a sense of respect and empathy, 
but in other moments they may actually instigate genocide. It is well documented, for 
instance, that the Rwandan genocide was incited by hate speech, mercilessly pitting Hutus 
against Tutsis. (Gourevitch, 1998; Schabas, 2000) Radio stations and newspapers fanned the 
fires of racialized hatred by telling stories about malicious ‘Tutsi cockroaches’. Nazi 
propaganda, too, depended heavily on anti-Semitic narratives, disseminated through a 
thriving cinema and print industry, of Jews as the ‘enemy within the state’. (Herf, 2006) If 
both Grbavica and Jud Süß, Veit Harlan’s infamous movie from 1940, recount evildoing and 
human suffering – the Jew Oppenheimer in Jud Süß rapes a German girl, and tortures her 
husband – how may we normatively distinguish them? 
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Whereas it is true that Lara’s model cannot supply us with any guarantee that storytelling 
will succeed in doing what it promises (Verdeja, 2009), this should not immediately send us 
on a quest for normative foundations – if by this we mean some form of transcendental, 
universal, a-historical morality. We require no ‘ethical theory’ to fathom that Hutu and Nazi 
propaganda pursued only one goal, namely to indoctrinate people so that they are turned into 
willing accomplices of murderous plans.15 The evildoing and human suffering depicted in 
these stories was purely instrumental, its purpose was to instill fear, resentment and fury in 
the audience. In contradistinction, stories that facilitate processes of learning from 
catastrophes do not proselytize their audience. Rather, these stories always remain open to 
deliberation and dispute. They should, of course, strive to elicit agreement from the public, 
but they must abstain from imposing their message with absolute assurance. 
 
All we need to normatively distinguish Grbavica from Jud Süß, then, is the capacity to 
uncover manipulative storytelling. In Kantian terminology, such storytelling treats the 
audience merely as a means to an end. Non-manipulative storytelling, on the other hand, 
seeks to persuade its public, yet it refrains from coercing it into espousing a certain 
message.16 Another way of expressing this idea would be to observe with Lisa Disch (1993, 
684) that a ‘skillful storyteller teaches her readers to see as she does, not what she does, 
affording them the “intoxicating” experience of seeing from multiple perspectives but 
leaving them with the responsibility to undertake the critical task of interpretation for 
themselves’. 
 
In reply to the critic, I would thus contend that the narrative approach is ultimately grounded 
in the respect for the dignity of the stories’ addressees. Apart from this proviso, storytelling 
advances ‘without banisters’, to invoke Arendt’s memorable phrase. It remains an unfinished 
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project that must go on so long as human suffering is experienced. However, there simply is 
no viable alternative to this project if the aim is to combat ‘genocide blindness’. This brings 
us back to the relationship between denial and blindness. From what has been said so far, it 
should be clear that both negative reactions to genocide are linked to each other. Deniers will 
have easy play if they advance their claims and pseudo-claims in an environment dominated 
by genocide blindness. Conversely, deniers may ‘imprison’ the members of the public 
sphere within a distorted vision of the world through the use of misleading narratives. 
Therefore, my argument does not detract from the struggle against genocide denial, but 
rather complements it with a concern for remedying genocide blindness. 
 
As we have seen in section II, the reasons for ignoring the occurrence of genocide are varied, 
from the intentional schemes of revisionists to the weakness of political will. In this context, 
targeting blindness can occupy a seminal place in altering the environment within which the 
genocide debate is held. The hope is that, if the members of the public sphere become 
sensitivized to emerging forms of violence through storytelling, they will gradually form a 
critical community of spectators, who might be able to exert pressure on political 
stakeholders. Such an ‘ocular’ community would serve as a robust bulwark against efforts to 
shirk the responsibility to stop atrocities.17 While this paper has not directly engaged with the 
politics of naming, it has set itself a more modest goal: underscoring the centrality of non-
manipulative storytelling for the multiple practices of justice, which together constitute the 
fight against genocide. One of those practices, I have argued, is enacted by those who shake 
the public with narratives of human suffering. In contrast with foundationalist and legalist 
propositions, the emphasis on cultivating political imagination leaves no room for the notion 
that the practical struggle over genocide can be resolved through theoretical means alone. 
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Rather, it exposes, less ambitiously, yet surely more realistically, how complex the process 
of coming to terms with genocide is. No banisters – but also no false promises. 
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 For a deflationary position regarding the practical effect of the word ‘genocide’ see: 
Glanville, 2009. 
2 Throughout this paper I intend to use ‘term’ and ‘word’ synonymously, and keep them 
apart from ‘concept’. This terminology reflects the concerns expressed by Wittgenstein 
about many uses of ‘concept’, which are summarized at the beginning of section III. 
3 From academic circles, the debate regularly spills over into the judicial arena. Sometimes 
genocide deniers take recourse to challenging the soundness of historical scholarship in the 
courtroom, as it has recently been the case in Irving v. Lipstadt, with its devastating ruling on 
David Irving’s ruminations. (Evans, 2001) 
4 I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for urging me to clarify this point.  
5 For a very strong (and disputed) equation of ‘holocaust denial’ and ‘climate change denial’ 
see: Tomkiewicz, 2011. For a more refined appraisal of environmental factors of violence 
see: Homer-Dixon, 1999. For the case of Tuvalu see: Barnett, 2003. For another position 
arguing that genocide can only be fought effectively if its social, economic and 
environmental pre-conditions – massive global inequality and predatory capitalism – are 
eradicated see: Levene, 2004. 
6 The idea that Wittgenstein may teach political theorists something crucial is not new. 
Following in the footsteps of Hanna Pitkin, several authors have attempted to recover 
Wittgenstein’s potential for exploring diverse political phenomena. See:  
Holt, 1997; Mouffe, 2000; Pitkin, 1972; Pleasants, 1999; Tully, 1989; Zerilli, 1998. A recent 
book (Robinson, 2009) even seeks to systematize political theory’s reception of Wittgenstein 
in general. 
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7 The following passages owe their existence to the perceptive and constructive criticism of 
one of the reviewers. I am very grateful for having been directed towards a better 
understanding of Wittgenstein in the context of ‘essentially contested concepts’. 
8 Many of these authors take their cues from Stanley Cavell’s influential interpretation. 
(Cavell, 1999) Cavell refers at several points to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘aspect-seeing’. 
(Cavell, 1981, 36; 2007, 282–283) For a very interesting use of ‘aspect-seeing’ in the 
analysis of ‘liberty’ see: Havercroft, 2003. For a feminist appropriation of Wittgenstein’s 
reflections see: Heyes, 2007, 15–37. 
9 In what follows, I will use ‘genealogy’ and ‘narratives’ as largely synonymous. This is 
obviously not fully compatible with Owen’s account of liberation from aspectival captivity. 
However, for my purpose it is important to emphasize the different fora in which 
‘emancipation and enlightenment’ can occur. Storytelling in precisely Lara’s sense appears 
to be the most promising manner to instil citizens with ‘a new way of seeing things’. 
10 On the relation between individual and collective dimensions of storytelling see: Appiah, 
2005, 22–23. 
11 Some scholars prefer to use the Hebrew word ‘Shoah’ instead of ‘Holocaust’. For a 
comprehensive account of both terms see: Petrie, 2000. 
12 For a recent contribution to the Holocaust debate that triggered a semantic shock, consider 
for example Timothy Snyder’s concept of ‘bloodlands’. (Snyder, 2010) 
13 See: Husanovic, 2009; Koebel, 2009; Todorova, 2011. 
14 In fact, both reviewers as well as the journal’s Editors have pressed me to clarify my 
position vis-à-vis the narrative approach’s normative foundations. I wish to thank them for 
their perceptive remarks. 
15 On the futility of (some types of) ethical theory for moral reasoning see: Williams, 1981, 
ix–x. 
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16 To be sure, powerful stories will often come perilously close to proselytizing, especially 
when their objective is to move the imagination of the public – the media frenzy around the 
Kony 2012 campaign, for example, testifies to the thin line separating manipulative from 
non-manipulative storytelling. (Cadwalladr, 2013; Waldorf, 2012) 
17 This notion of a critical community of spectators could be further elaborated with 
reference to Jeffrey Green’s model of plebiscitary democracy (2010). 
